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Abstract 
This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the optimal levels 
and welfare effects of alcohol taxes and drunk-driver penalties, accounting for externalities and how 
policies interact with the broader fiscal system. We find that the fiscal component of the optimal alcohol 
tax exceeds the externality-correcting component under many parameter scenarios and assumptions about 
revenue recycling; overall, the optimal tax is anything from three to more than ten times the current tax. 
For more incremental reforms, however, welfare gains from stiffer drunk-driver fines and non-pecuniary 
penalties are larger, even though they involve implementation costs, possible first-order deadweight 
losses, and fiscal considerations play a minor role. In contrast to current practice, fiscal considerations 
warrant relatively heavier taxation of beer and relatively lighter taxation of spirits.   
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  Although alcohol excise taxes raise $12 billion in revenue for federal and state governments, tax 
rates are at historically low levels; alcohol taxes currently are 12 percent of pre-tax prices compared with 
50 percent in 1970 (Kenkel 1996). Federal tax rates were last increased in 1984 and 1991 as part of 
deficit-reduction packages; given looming budgetary pressures as the baby-boom generation begins to 
retire, it is an opportune time to reassess the role of alcohol taxes as a revenue-raising measure.  
Previous literature on efficient alcohol taxes (Manning et al. 1989, 1991; Phelps 1988; Pogue and 
Sgontz 1989; Kenkel 1996) primarily focused on measuring externalities, such as drunk-driver crashes 
and lifetime medical burdens on third parties from alcohol-related illness. Little attention has been paid to 
the fiscal rationale for alcohol taxes; that is, that they reduce revenue needed from other taxes to finance 
the government’s budget over time, especially those on current (or future) labor income. Theoretical 
literature in public finance and environmental economics shows that a tax shift off labor and on to a 
commodity can increase labor supply and thereby justify an excise tax greater than any Pigouvian tax, if 
that commodity is a relative leisure complement (Sandmo 1975; Bovenberg and Goulder 2002; Parry and 
Small 2005). However, this framework has not been applied specifically to alcohol policy, leaving a 
number of unanswered questions.
 
Most obvious is how much additional taxation of alcohol might be warranted on fiscal grounds 
and whether this is important or not relative to the externality rationale for taxation. Another issue is how 
the alcohol/leisure complementarity argument for taxation is related to empirical studies on the health-
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induced workplace productivity effects of alcohol abuse. A broader issue is whether the fiscal rationale 
for alcohol taxation is undermined if extra revenues ultimately finance more public spending instead of 
reductions in current (or future) taxes (Becker and Mulligan 2003). 
A second set of issues revolves around the priority for alcohol tax increases over other policies, 
particularly when large tax increases might be impractical. In this regard, raising a moderate amount of 
extra revenue through higher expected drunk-driver penalties might yield larger welfare gains, as this 
targets drunk drivers directly, rather than penalizing all alcohol consumers. And what if the alternative is 
stiffer non-pecuniary penalties, such as increased likelihood and duration of jail terms? Unlike fines, these 
penalties impose a first-order deadweight loss on households that is not offset by a transfer to the 
government (Becker 1968), they forgo potential efficiency gains from revenue recycling, and their 
implementation may involve significant policing, judicial, and other government resource costs. Do these 
inefficiencies imply that moderately higher alcohol taxes produce greater welfare gains than higher non-
pecuniary, drunk-driver penalties? And how does the level of drunk-driver penalties affect the optimal 
alcohol tax? 
A final issue is whether or not differential taxation of individual beverages is efficient. Saffer and 
Chaloupka (1994) show that there is not much basis for uneven taxation on externality grounds alone 
unless there are strong cross-price effects among beverages. To what extent might fiscal considerations 
modify this result if individual beverages have different own-price and leisure cross-price elasticities?  
This paper develops an analytical framework to conceptualize these issues and implements it by 
compiling evidence on underlying parameters. One caveat is that various labor-supply dimensions of 
alcohol policies currently are uncertain in the empirical literature, and, therefore, we cannot pin down the 
optimal policy with confidence. Instead, our purpose is to identify useful policy implications that appear 
robust across broad parameter scenarios and to develop intuitive formulas for optimal policies and 
welfare effects that are updated readily in light of new empirical evidence. We summarize the main 
findings as follows. 
  We put the Pigouvian component of the optimal alcohol tax at $68 per alcohol gallon (roughly 
$1.60 for a typical six-pack of beer or bottle of wine); drunk-driver crashes account for 91 percent of 
costs.  
Alcohol appears to be a relative complement for leisure (for a given health status), implying a 
positive fiscal component to the optimal alcohol tax when the tax is revenue-neutral; this component 
exceeds the Pigouvian tax in most of our parameter scenarios. To the extent that alcohol abuse also 
reduces tax revenue from effective labor supply through illness or auto injuries, this reinforces the case 
for setting taxes above the Pigouvian level, though this effect typically is smaller than the fiscal 
component. These results are somewhat robust to allowing for alternative revenue uses because even if 
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there are no efficiency gains from revenue recycling, there still can be significant gains due to 
alcohol/leisure complementarity (though the fiscal basis for additional taxation would be undermined if 
revenues financed pork-barrel spending with social value well below the dollars spent). Overall, we put 
the optimized alcohol tax at anything from three to more than ten times the prevailing tax.  
As regards more incremental reforms, welfare gains from increasing expected drunk-driver fines 
significantly exceed those from imposing the same tax burden on all alcohol consumers, while those from 
higher expected jail terms are moderately higher. Even though these policies involve significant 
implementation costs, possible first-order deadweight costs, and fiscal interactions are far less important 
in relative terms, these drawbacks are offset by their advantage in targeting the road safety externality 
more directly.
1 This underscores that higher alcohol taxes should complement, rather than substitute for, 
stiffer drunk-driver penalties. We also find that although the optimal alcohol tax declines with drunk-
driver fines, paradoxically it is not affected by the level of non-pecuniary penalties, and optimized 
expected drunk-driver penalties are between $0.8 and $1.9 per mile of drunk driving, compared with 
prevailing penalties of $0.3 per mile.  
Finally, fiscal considerations suggest that beer should be taxed relatively heavily and sprits 
relatively lightly on an alcohol-equivalent basis; in contrast, current policy taxes spirits most heavily and 
wine and beer roughly the same.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next three sections develop our analytical 
framework, discuss parameter values, and present the results. A final section offers conclusions and 
discusses limitations and future applications of this type of analysis at the intersection of health 
economics and public finance. 
 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
A. Model Assumptions    
(i) Preferences. Given our focus on economy-wide policies and that distributional issues are beyond our 
scope (see Section 5), it is reasonable to employ a representative agent framework. The behavioral 
responses of this agent to policy changes represent an aggregation of responses over different population 
                                                      
1 Although we do not model increased duration of license suspensions or mandated use of vehicle breathalyzer 
interlock technologies, welfare gains from these policies are likely larger than those for the equivalent additional jail 
penalty, as they prevent recidivism over a longer period of time. 
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subgroups in the real economy (e.g., heavy drinkers and abstainers) and are later calibrated to 
econometric studies that account for such heterogeneity.
2  
We use a one-period model representing an agent’s life cycle. The utility function is:  
(1a)  ) , , , , , , , , (
P
D
h m G M D H l C D A A U U τ = ,  A A A
h m = +  
(1b)  ) , , , ( M D D A H H
h = ,      L l H T + = ) (  
Variables are per capita, present values over the period, expressed on an annualized basis; a bar denotes 
an economy-wide variable exogenous to individual agents.  
In (1a) A denotes gallons of alcohol consumption, consisting of alcohol consumed in moderation 
A
m and during bouts of heavy drinking A
h (individual beverages are disaggregated later). D is driving trips 
taken after heavy drinking, C is a general consumption good, l is leisure, H  is fatal and non-fatal 
health/injury risks, τD is (expected) non-pecuniary penalties incurred per drunk-driver trip from jail terms 
and license suspensions, M is spending on medical services, and G
P is government spending on public 
goods. U is a well-behaved function, decreasing in H and τDD, weakly increasing in M , and strictly 
increasing in other arguments.  M U  is possible marginal utility from paternalistic preferences over 
medical care received by other individuals that are a possible, though contentious, justification for 
medical care subsidies.  
  In 1(b) health effects are increasing in the agent’s own heavy drinking and drunk driving and the 
drunk driving of others and decreasing with own consumption of medical services. T is an agent’s 
expected lifespan, which declines with the risk of premature mortality; time is allocated between leisure 
and work, L.  
  
(ii) Production. All goods are produced under constant returns by competitive firms employing labor as 
the only (primary) input, so there are no pure profits. Firms pay a gross wage of w equal to the value 
marginal product of labor. W = wL is “effective” labor supply where  H W ∂ ∂ /  < 0 if alcohol abuse 
reduces on-the-job productivity or the ability to obtain and maintain stable employment.  
The government pays for fraction s of medical services, representing tax exemptions for medical 
insurance and direct spending, such as Medicaid; the remainder is covered by insurance companies 
charging a lump-sum premium KM and a variable fee per dollar of services vM < 1, representing uncovered 
costs. Similarly, for auto repair, firms charge a lump-sum insurance premium of KD and an (expected) 
                                                      
2 Kaplow (2005) suggests that interactions between externality taxes and labor taxes wash out with heterogeneous 
agents for “distribution neutral” tax shifts. However, this result hinges on two conditions, neither of which apply in 
our case; these are that alcohol is an average leisure substitute and that all external costs reduce the marginal value 
of work relative to that of leisure (Williams 2005). 
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variable cost equivalent to vD per drunk-driver trip, reflecting deductibles and elevated future premiums 
following an auto accident; vD < cD where cD is the (expected) cost of auto repair to firms per drunk-driver 
trip.
3 vM and vD are given while KM and KD adjust so firm profits are zero in equilibrium. Other third-party 
costs of alcohol abuse, such as group life insurance, are incorporated in the model parameterization.  
  
(iii) Government. The government budget constraint is: 
(2)    D r t A t W t sM G G D A L
T P ) ( − + + = + +
where G
T is lump-sum transfer spending or spending that is a close substitute for private goods, such as 
education. tL, tA and tD denote, respectively, a proportional tax on labor income, a specific tax on alcohol 
consumption, and an expected fine per drunk-driver trip equal to the fine per conviction times the 
probability of arrest and conviction. r denotes average government resource costs per drunk-driver trip, 
including police costs associated with breathalizer testing and arrests, judicial costs, and the cost of 
accommodating jail sentences. We assume both   and   > 0; even if t
D rτ D t r D is increased through higher 
fines per conviction, rather than higher arrest rates, this may protract legal process. 
 
(iv) Agent optimization. The household budget constraint is:  
(3)  W I C p M v D t v A t p C M D D A A
~
) ( ) ( + = + + + + +  
where p denotes a pre-tax price,   is lump-sum income net of lump-sum insurance 
payments, and 
D M
T K K G I − − =
L w W ~ ~
=  is labor earnings, where  w t w L) 1 ( ~ − =  is the net wage.  




A H mpc t p
U
⋅ + + =
λ
,  D D D D
D H mpc t v
U
⋅ + + + = τ
λ
,    
M M v H mpc = ⋅ − ,   =
λ
l U
w ~  
where  λ is the marginal utility of income, and we have normalized  λ τ / D D U − =1 so that the non-
pecuniary penalty is expressed in monetary equivalents.   is the marginal 
private cost of health risks, consisting of direct disutility from suffering 
)
~ ~ / ( H H H W T w U mpc + + − = λ
λ / H U − , the value of reduced 
life expectancy  H T w ~ − , and lost wages from lower productivity  H W
~
− . 
                                                      
3 Other private costs of driving, such as fuel and time costs, are netted out implicitly from the benefit of driving in 
the utility function. We ignore other auto externalities (e.g., pollution, national security, congestion), as they are 
small relative to accident costs per mile of drunk driving (see Parry and Small 2005 and below). 
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From (4), agents equate the marginal private benefit from heavy drinking with the tax-inclusive 
alcohol price and the own-heath cost, and they equate the marginal benefit from drunk driving with the 
expected out-of-pocket expenses for auto crashes, government penalties, and own health risks. They also 
equate the marginal private benefit from medical care with the variable cost and the marginal value of 
leisure with the net wage, which is below the marginal value product of labor due to the labor tax. 
From (1), (3) and (4) we can express the demand and labor supply functions as:
4
(5)  ,   y = A ) , , , , (
P T
L A G G H t t y y =
m, A
h, D, C, M, L 
 
B. Optimal Tax and Penalty Formulas 
(i) Marginal welfare effect from an increase in tA. This is obtained by totally differentiating the indirect 
utility function, accounting for changes in tL, G
T and G
P to maintain government budget balance; the 
result is (see Appendix A) 




















MEG P +  
(6b)  ,   ) /( ) ( AA DA
D
hA
h h A A D E A E E η η η + =
h E h A M M M U v ) / 1 ( λ − − = , 
 









where  ,   and  < 0 denote elasticities of alcohol consumption, heavy drinking, and drunk 
driving with respect to the alcohol price, and   is the marginal efficiency gain (or loss) from 
public goods (i.e., the value to households per dollar of extra spending minus the dollar). 
AA η hA η DA η
P G MEG
The marginal welfare effect consists of (i) the reduction in alcohol times the marginal external 
cost of alcohol E
A, net of the alcohol tax; (ii) the change in effective labor supply times the labor tax; and 
(iii)   times any increase public goods. E P G MEG
A equals the external cost per gallon of heavy drinking, 
E
h, and per drunk-driver trip, E
D, each expressed in costs per alcohol gallon, and multiplied by  /  
and  /  to account for the responsiveness of A
hA η AA η
DA η AA η
h and D relative to that for overall alcohol 
consumption (Pogue and Sgontz 1989; Kenkel 1996).  
                                                      
4 Income effects from changes in KM and KD are very small and are ignored. We also assume that the effect of a 
given increase in alcohol tax on alcohol consumption and drunk driving (though not labor supply) is the same, 
regardless of how alcohol tax revenues are used; this is reasonable given their small budget shares. 
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E
h is the lifetime medical burden from additional heavy drinking multiplied by  , which is 
the portion of marginal costs paid by the government (s) and by insurance companies (
M v − 1
M v s − − 1 ). 
Portion  λ / M U −  of medical costs is excluded from external costs because of the positive consumption 
externality; for example, if medical subsidies are fully justified by paternalistic preferences 
( s U M = − λ / ), only the medical burden to insurance companies is an external cost (Browning 1999).  
E
D consists of (i) injury risks to other road users from a drunk-driver trip  D H mpc⋅ ; (ii) expected 
property damages from the trip net of costs internal to individuals  D D v c − ; (iii) external costs of the 
added medical burden from injury risks to the driver and other road users; and (iv) government resource 
costs per trip. E
D also is defined net of the expected drunk-driver fine but not the non-pecuniary penalty. 
To see this, consider Figure 1 where the (gross of externality) deadweight loss from combined penalties, 
D D t τ + , is shown by the gray shaded area and comprises the usual second-order effect from the 
distortion of demand, and rectangle  D D τ , equal to the first-order utility loss from non-pecuniary 
penalties, which is not offset by a revenue gain to the government. Higher alcohol taxes shift in the drunk 
driving demand curve and increase the combined deadweight loss by the black rectangle, or   per unit 
reduction in D, rather than 
D t
D D t τ +  (although  D τ  is part of the price distortion, there is a saving of  D τ  in 
the first-order deadweight costs of the non-pecuniary penalty per unit reduction in D).  
 
(ii) Disentangling labor supply effects. The change in effective labor supply can be decomposed into three 




















































First is productivity increases from improved health, encompassing increases in w and in hours worked L. 
Second is the effect of higher alcohol prices (for given health), as determined by the degree of 
substitution between alcohol and leisure. Third is the effect of revenue recycling: using revenues to 
reduce tL will increase labor supply, while using them to increase G
T will have the opposite effect because 
leisure is a normal good. Expanding the provision of public goods may increase or decrease labor supply 
depending on whether it increases or decreases the marginal utility of consumption relative to leisure 
(Atkinson and Stern 1974); given there is little evidence on this either way, we adopt the neutral case 
where   = 0. 
P G L ∂ ∂ /
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(iii) Optimal tax when revenues finance reductions in tL. From (6a) and (7) the optimal, revenue-neutral, 
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h
A
A A D t r M M s A sM g h η η η − + + + =  
Al η  is the elasticity of demand for alcohol with respect to the price of leisure (or household wage),   > 
0 is the labor supply elasticity, 
LL ε
LI η  <0 is the income elasticity of labor supply, and c denotes a 
compensated elasticity.  > 0 is the marginal efficiency gain from using a dollar of revenue to cut 
the labor tax, equivalent to the marginal efficiency cost from increasing t
L t MEG
L per dollar of extra revenue. g
A 
is savings in government medical and resource outlays, net of the reduction in revenue from drunk-driver 
fines, per gallon reduction in alcohol. The optimum alcohol tax differs from the Pigouvian tax, defined as 
the marginal external cost with no labor tax, due to three effects.  
First is the “revenue-recycling” effect, or efficiency gain from using extra revenues to cut the 
labor tax, and equals   times marginal revenue per gallon reduction in alcohol, including savings in 
government medical and resource expenditures (note that 
L t MEG
dA dt A t p A AA A A / / ) ( ⋅ = + η ). This effect is 
greater the more inelastic the demand for alcohol, as this implies a larger first order revenue gain per unit 
reduction in consumption.  
Second is the “tax-interaction” effect, or welfare impact from the change in labor supply, caused 
by the increase in price of alcohol relative to leisure (for given health status) per unit reduction in alcohol; 
it is derived from  , multiplied by  ) / /( ) / ( A A L dt dA t L w t ∂ ∂ ) 1 (
L t MEG +  to account for the value of lost 
revenue that is made up through higher labor taxes. The tax-interaction effect incorporates the pure 
substitution effect between alcohol and leisure, which reduces/increases labor supply if   is 
c
Al η
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positive/negative, and a negative income effect, which increases labor supply because leisure is a normal 
good ( LI η  < 0). We call the difference between the revenue-recycling and tax-interaction effects the 
fiscal component of the optimal tax; substituting   from the Slutsky equation, and leaving 
aside g
c
LL LL LI ε ε η − =




Al ε η <
5  
Finally, the “productivity effect” is the efficiency gain from the health-induced increase in 
effective labor supply. It equals tL times the increase in gross earnings per unit reduction in alcohol,  , 
times  to account for the value of additional labor tax revenue (reductions in net of tax earnings 
are internal to individuals). 
A
WH θ
L t MEG + 1
 
(iv) Optimal tax when revenues finance additional public spending. In this case the optimal tax is (see 
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β ,  
for i = T or P.   is the efficiency change per dollar increase in the transfer payment, which is 
(slightly) negative due to the reduction in labor supply from the income effect. In a more general 
framework,   might be positive overall if transfer spending is motivated by, for example, 
distributional or social insurance objectives. Comparing (8) and (9), the revenue recycling effect is larger 
or smaller, depending on whether the marginal efficiency gain from increased public spending is larger or 
T G MEG
T G MEG
                                                      
5   is equivalent to the elasticity of aggregate consumption with respect to the price of leisure in our model. The 
revenue-recycling and tax-interaction effects previously have been discussed in the context of environmental 
policies (e.g., Goulder et al. 1997, Parry and Oates 2000), though they have not been expressed in an optimal tax 
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smaller than the marginal efficiency gain for cutting other taxes.
6 For the remaining policies below, we 
focus just on the revenue-neutral case. 
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,  =1,   =0 
D t σ
D τ σ
where j = tD or  D τ , and  DD η  and  Dl η  are the elasticity of drunk driving with respect to penalties and the 
price of leisure respectively,  D
D D t E E + =
~
 is the external cost per trip defined gross of the expected 
fine, and we have ignored cross-price effects on alcohol consumption, which are small (see Appendix A).  
D t E  is the Pigouvian fine, equal to the (gross) external cost per trip, less the marginal increase in 
resource costs needed to raise the expected fine,  ) / /( / ) ( D t DD D D t dt dD D t r
D D τ η τ = + . Leaving aside 
resource costs and assuming the initial fine is zero, the Pigouvian equivalent for the non-pecuniary 
penalty, 
D E
τ , is smaller than the Pigouvian fine if the demand for drunk driving is inelastic; in this case 
the first-order addition to the height of the deadweight loss rectangle in Figure 1 exceeds the reduction in 
its width from the reduction in trips. Terms g
j and   are analogous to before, though they are 
expressed per trip, and exclude heavy drinking effects.  
D
WH θ
As before, the optimal expected fine per trip differs from the Pigouvian tax due to the revenue-
recycling, tax-interaction and productivity effects. The revenue-recycling effect is smaller the larger the 
incremental increase in resource costs rj and likely is negative under the non-pecuniary penalty that does 
not generate any first-order increase in revenue.  
 
                                                      
6 The βi term adjusts the tax-interaction effect for the efficiency effects of neutralizing induced changes in labor tax 
revenues by adjusting G
T or G
P, rather than tL.  
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(vi) Taxation of individual beverages. We now assume: 














h h A A A A A =
(11b)  ,  ,   i = BE, WI, SP 








h are now composites for moderate and heavy alcohol consumption that are (weakly 
quasi-concave) functions of individual beverages: beer (BE), wine (WI) and spirits (SP). In (11b) we 
assume that marginal external costs and productivity effects per alcohol gallon are the same across these 
beverages.
7  
  Optimal beverage taxes are given by (see Appendix A): 






− − Σ − = ≠
i ii
k ki
k k i k i i A
A
t t t t
η
η
) ˆ ( ˆ * *  
where i, k = BE, WI, SP and  ii η  and  ki η  denote own- and cross-price beverage elasticities.   is the 
optimal tax in the absence of cross-price effects among beverages and is analogous to that in (8a); thus, 
the optimal tax on one beverage likely is higher than that for another if it is more inelastic and more 
complementary to leisure. To the extent that beverages are substitutes (
*
i t
ki η  > 0), the optimal tax   is 
likely somewhat lower than   because as one beverage tax is increased above its initial level, the 
substitution into other beverages reduces efficiency, assuming all beverage taxes initially are below their 
optimal levels. Given the lack of solid evidence on beverage cross-price effects, and that they only 
moderately affect optimal taxes (Saffer and Chaloupka 1994), our discussion below focuses on 







(vii) Welfare effects. For increasing the overall alcohol tax from an initial level   to  , and drunk-driver 
penalties from j
0
A t A t
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where   and 
L D t t MEG MEG = 0 =
D MEGτ . The welfare gain from a marginal increase in the tax or 
penalty is the induced quantity reduction times the difference between the optimum and prevailing 
                                                      
7 This is a standard assumption (Saffer and Chaloupka 1994) because data on auto accidents, health, and 
productivity impacts are not decomposed by beverage type.  
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penalty, times  if extra revenue is raised and used to cut the labor tax; integrating over the 
entire tax increase gives the total welfare gain. Alternatively, welfare effects can be expressed in terms of 
quantities and elasticities by substituting for the price coefficients. 
L t MEG + 1
To compute optimal taxes/penalties, we assume external costs per unit of drunk driving and 

























































3. Parameter Values 
  We now discuss parameter values used to implement the above formulas. These values are for 
year 2000 and are (mostly) summarized in Table 1; Appendix B provides a detailed justification, and 
documentation, for chosen values where it is not provided below. For critical parameters that are 
uncertain, we consider ranges of values. 
 
A. Baseline Data 
Initial alcohol consumption A
0 = 493 million gallons of pure alcohol (or ethanol), with beer, wine, 
and spirits accounting for 56 percent, 14 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, of alcohol gallons. Excise 
tax rates (at federal and state level) for these beverages are $20.1, $17.5 and $34.8 per alcohol gallon, 
respectively, with an average rate of $24.2 per alcohol gallon or 12 percent of the pre-tax price pA = $197 
per alcohol gallon. We assume initial drunk-driver trips D
0 = 1,287 million, and the probability of 
conviction is 1/1,562 per trip. 
 
B. External Costs 
Drunk-driver costs and penalties. We put the marginal external cost of drunk driving at E
DD/A = $61.9 
per alcohol gallon, or $23.7 per (14-mile) trip; injuries to other road users and pedestrians, property 
damages, medical costs, and government resource costs account for 53 percent, 27 percent, 10 percent, 
and 11 percent of these costs, respectively, while expected drunk-driver fines internalize just 1 percent of 
costs (Appendix B). Only 17 percent of injuries in crashes with alcohol involvement are counted as 
external (from Levitt and Porter 2001), as the added risk to other road users is the excess rate above the 
normal risk for sober drivers and excludes injuries in single-vehicle crashes that are internal and account 
for about two-thirds of all alcohol-related injuries. The private cost per fatality, mpc, is the value of life 
  12Resources for the Future    Parry et al. 
 
(assumed to be $4.0 million for the average drunk driver) and for non-fatal injuries it mainly is quality-
adjusted life years. External costs from property damage apply to all excess single- and multi-vehicle 
crashes; the risk of elevated future insurance premiums internalizes 17 percent of these costs. We assume 
that 20 percent of medical costs are borne by individuals in variable costs and 40 percent by the 
government in tax subsidies and Medicare and that half of the government subsidy is justified by 
paternalistic preferences; overall, 60 percent of medical costs (which also apply to excess injuries in 
single- and multi-vehicle crashes) are external.
8  
Drunk-driver penalties are obtained by aggregating state-level data on arrests and penalties; non-
pecuniary penalties (from jail terms and license suspensions) are valued at $9.9 per alcohol gallon, or $3.8 
per trip; however, as discussed above, they do not affect the optimal alcohol tax.  
 
Heavy drinking costs. Two widely cited studies have estimated these costs. Harwood et al. (1998), 
updated in Harwood (2000), put the annualized medical cost of alcohol abuse at $12.0 billion or $24 per 
alcohol gallon (excluding auto injuries) using estimates of the fraction of alcohol-related illnesses due to 
alcohol use. This figure likely is too high for our purposes as it excludes savings in medical costs from 
premature mortality and health benefits to moderate drinkers. Instead, we rely on Manning et al. (1989), 
who put lifetime medical costs for all individuals at equivalent to $6.5 per alcohol gallon from comparing 
outcomes for heavy and moderate drinkers over time.
9 Netting out altruism and variable costs gives $3.9 
per alcohol gallon. Manning et al. (1989) also estimate external costs from life insurance and retirement 
pensions at the equivalent of $1.0 and $1.4 per alcohol gallon, respectively; including these gives our 
benchmark value E
hA
h/A = $6.3 per alcohol gallon.  
 
C. Elasticities 
Labor supply elasticities. Based on expert views in Fuchs et al. (1998) and the review of empirical 
evidence in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), we choose  = LL ε  0.15,   0.35, and hence  =
c
LL ε = LI η  
−0.20.
10  
                                                      
8 Earlier estimates of drunk-driver external costs include Manning et al. (1989), Miller and Blincoe (1994), and 
Kenkel (1993a). Levitt and Porter (2001) put the external cost for 1994 at $8,000 per arrest, which converts to $22.3 
per alcohol gallon using our assumption about the value of life. This is for fatality costs alone; our corresponding 
estimate is $23.0 per gallon.  
 
9 This figure is the total medical cost to individuals and third parties, scaled to exclude auto injuries, and updated to 
year 2000. 
 
10 These values represent an average over males and females and hours worked and participation elasticities. There 
is much variation across different empirical studies; however, if anything, we believe our values are conservative, as 
far greater responses are needed to explain, at least in part, business cycle fluctuations and large differences in work 
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Alcohol elasticities. Numerous studies have estimated own-price elasticities for alcohol, though there are 
serious methodological challenges (Cook and Moore 2000); we consider a range for all beverages of  AA η  
= –0.4 to –1.0.
11 Evidence on whether heavy alcohol consumption is more or less price elastic than 
alcohol as a whole is mixed;
12 however, our results are not very sensitive to this parameter given the 
relatively small contribution of heavy drinking costs in E
A, and we set  AA hA η η = . Based on reviews by 
Clements et al. (1997) and Leung and Phelps (1993), we illustrate cases where the own-price elasticity for 
beer is up to 50 percent below the wine price elasticity, while the spirits elasticity is up to 50 percent 
above that for wine; the wine price elasticity is taken as –0.7.  
We use two pieces of information to gauge a range for  . First, this elasticity can be separated 
into two components (see Appendix A): 
c
Al η









~ η ε η η + =





, η  is the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity 
for given labor income. The first component reflects the allocation of extra labor income (following the 
reduction in leisure) to alcohol, while the second reflects possible changes in the marginal utility from 
alcohol relative to other goods as leisure falls. Estimates of income elasticities (which approximate 
expenditure elasticities) averaged across all beverages are positive but typically below 0.5.





, η  < 0 if people spend less time at places of hospitality or lingering over dinner with a 





, η  = 0, and assuming 
W A
~ η  = 0.1−0.6, gives a (conservative) range of   = 0.04−0.21. 
c
Al η
                                                                                                                                                                           
effort between Americans and Europeans (Prescott 2004). In addition, effective labor supply responses are greater 
over the longer term when human capital investments are endogenous (Kapicka 2005). 
 
11 Recent estimates for the United States include –0.74 in Baltagi and Goel (1990), –0.69 in Baltagi and Griffin 
(1995), –0.72 in Lee and Tremblay (1992), –0.80 in Manning et al. (1995), –0.87 in Manning and Mullahy (1998),  
–.50 in Nelson and Moran (1995), –0.10 in Selvanathan (1991), and –0.34 in Yan (1994). (In some cases we have 
averaged over individual beverage elasticities.) 
 
12 See Manning et al. (1995), Grossman et al. (1987), Cook and Tauchen (1982), Pogue and Sgontz (1989), Kenkel 
(1993a), Becker et al. (1991) and Farrell et al. (2003). 
 
13 Recent estimates (averaging over all beverages) include 0.10 in Baltagi and Griffin (1995), below 0.10 in Farrel et 
al. (2003), 0.11 in Lee and Tremblay (1992), 0.25 in Manning et al. (1995), 0.40 in Nelson and Moran (1995), 0.18 
in Ruhm (1995), 0.89 in Selvanathan (1991), and 0.4 in Yen (1994). 
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Second, West and Parry (2006) directly estimate   from an Almost Ideal Demand System over 
alcohol, leisure, and other consumption estimated with household data. Their central value is −0.09, with 




~ η  is at the lower end of 








14 Typical income elasticity estimates for beer are lower than for wine and higher for spirits; 
we illustrate cases where all beverages are equally complementary to leisure and where beer is 
moderately more complementary to leisure than wine and vice versa for spirits. 
 
Drunk-driver elasticities. We assume  DA η  =  AA η  and  DD η = −0.4 to −1.0 based on estimated responses 
of drunk driving and highway fatalities to alcohol prices (see Appendix B). There is little empirical basis 
for gauging the drunk-driver/leisure cross-price elasticity; however, as explained below, it is generally of 





D. Productivity Effects 
  From our accident data we estimate productivity losses from auto injuries at $12.5 per alcohol 
gallon or   = $4.8 per drunk-driver trip. As regards other productivity effects, it seems plausible that 
heavy drinkers suffer from difficulty of finding and retaining employment, while for moderate drinkers 
there might be little effect (Cook and Moore 2000; Cook and Peters 2005). However, as discussed in 
Appendix B, empirical evidence on this is highly conflicting and some studies implicitly estimate the 
productivity, revenue-recycling, and tax-interaction effects combined, rather than isolating the 
productivity effect. Manning et al. (1989) and Harwood (2000) are representative of a small and a 
substantial productivity impact respectively (for auto injuries and illness combined), and we use them 
(after updating) to infer an overall range of   = $12.0−$174 per alcohol gallon; for the revenue-neutral 






                                                      
14 West and Parry (2006) also estimate that   <  ; that is, alcohol is a relative (if not absolute) leisure 






Al η AA η , and  , 




15 We use a somewhat higher value than for the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity because the alcohol expenditure 
elasticity likely is larger for drunk drivers, who are dominated by younger, single individuals. 
 
16 The Harwood estimate implies annual productivity losses of $86 billion, or about 40 percent of annual earnings, 
for the typical heavy drinker. This excludes productivity losses from premature mortality, as we assume that the loss 
of tax revenues would be offset by a reduction of government spending, to keep per capita spending constant. The 
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E. Other Parameters 
Following others (e.g., Ballard 1990; Goulder et al. 1997; Prescott 2004), we assume a labor tax 
(which combines federal and state income taxes, payroll taxes, broad sales taxes) of tL = 0.4 along with 
labor supply elasticities; this implies   = 0.11. In addition,   = −0.07, though as noted, 
transfer spending may have broader social benefits. We illustrate a range where the marginal efficiency 
gain from public spending (either transfers or public goods) is −0.1 to 0.2.  
L t MEG T G MEG
Based on the assumption that half of the increase in an expected drunk-driver penalty is due to an 
increase in that penalty per conviction and half is due to an increase in the arrest rate (holding the 









A. Alcohol Tax 
  We begin by underscoring the potential importance of fiscal considerations for the overall 
optimal alcohol tax. Figure 2 shows the fiscal component, expressed relative to the Pigouvian tax, for 
different own- and leisure-cross price elasticities for alcohol (and our mid-range value for the productivity 
effect). For the revenue-neutral case in panel (a), the fiscal component is relatively large and exceeds the 
Pigouvian tax in most scenarios; in fact, the tax-interaction effect is a welfare gain that reinforces the 
revenue-recycling effect when the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is below 0.2. Overall, when the 
own-price alcohol elasticity is –0.7, the fiscal component is 100 percent and 200 percent of the Pigouvian 
tax if the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is 0.12 and 0, respectively. Even when the alcohol/leisure 
cross-price elasticity is 0.2, the fiscal component is still sizeable, amounting to 28–120 percent of the 
Pigouvian tax.  
  Panel (b) illustrates the case when alcohol tax revenues finance additional public spending given 
an alcohol demand elasticity of –0.7. When the marginal efficiency gain from public spending exceeds 
that from cutting other taxes (i.e., it exceeds 0.11), the fiscal component is larger than in the revenue-
neutral case due to the larger revenue-recycling effect. But even when the marginal efficiency gain is zero 
                                                                                                                                                                           
above figures should be viewed with caution, as they come from comparing labor market outcomes of alcohol-
dependent individuals to other individuals and are subject to problems of unobserved confounding factors (e.g., 
motivation) and errors in self-reported drinking. 
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and there is no revenue-recycling effect, the fiscal component still may be large⎯it varies from 0 to 3 
times the Pigouvian tax⎯due to the positive tax-interaction effect.  
  Table 2 summarizes optimal alcohol taxes and welfare gains from various tax reforms under 
alternative parameter scenarios for the revenue-neutral case and, to be conservative, when the marginal 
efficiency gain from public spending is zero. The Pigouvian tax is $68 per alcohol gallon, with 91 percent 
and 9 percent of this due to the drunk-driver and heavy drinking externalities respectively.
17 The 
productivity effect adds another $6 to $80 per alcohol gallon to the optimal tax but is less than the fiscal 
component in most cases. Under revenue neutrality, the fiscal component adds anything from roughly $20 
to well over $300 per alcohol gallon, while with increased spending it adds between $0 and $168 per 
alcohol gallon. Overall, the optimal tax is anywhere from three to more than ten times the current tax of 
$24 per alcohol gallon. 
Welfare gains, shown in the lower part of Table 2, are $1.1 to $6.6 billion for a 50 percent 
increase in the alcohol tax above its current level; $1.8 to $12.9 billion for a doubling of the tax; $2.4 to 
$24.9 billion for a trebling of the tax, and, in many cases, much larger for optimizing over tax rates.  
 
B. Drunk-Driver Penalties 
   Table 3 shows optimal drunk-driver penalties and welfare gains from raising penalties under 
alternative parameter scenarios. We note the following points. 
  First, resource costs and first-order deadweight losses from non-pecuniary penalties play a 
significant role in reducing the Pigouvian tax or tax equivalent. Even though the external cost per drunk-
driver trip is $23.5, the Pigouvian fine is $7.3 to $18.8 per trip, depending on the drunk-driver elasticity, 
while the Pigouvian equivalent for the jail penalty is $5.7 to $14.6 per trip.  
Second, the fiscal component generally is much smaller relative to the Pigouvian component for 
drunk-driver fines as opposed to alcohol taxes, and the revenue-recycling advantage of fines over non-
pecuniary penalties also is relatively small (aside from when own- and cross-price elasticities both take on 
their lower bound values). The drunk-driver external cost is about six times current drunk-driver 
penalties, so welfare gains in this market from higher penalties typically swamp those in the labor market; 
in contrast, external costs for alcohol are “only” 30 percent of the consumer price, so welfare gains in this 
market from higher taxes can be dominated by those in the labor market.
18 A related point is that welfare 
                                                      
17 The Pigouvian tax is somewhat sensitive to alternative parameter choices. For example, it varies from $64.8 to 
$71.7 as paternalistic preferences justify 0 to 100 percent of medical subsidies; from $56.7 to $79.7 as the value of 
life varies from $2 to $6 million; and from $39.0 to $97.5 as drunk-driver and heavy drinking elasticities take low 
and high values given the mid-range value for the own-price alcohol elasticity.  
 
18 A parallel result applies in the context of environmental policies. Welfare effects from fiscal interactions are 
relatively large when internalizing pollution damages through (freely allocated) emissions permits would reduce 
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gains in Table 3 increase as drunk driving becomes more price-elastic, while in Table 2 they fall with 
greater price elasticity. More elastic responses imply greater externality benefits from a given price 
increase, but they also diminish the revenue-recycling and tax-interaction effects (see above); the former 
effect dominates for drunk-driver penalties.  
Third, even though non-pecuniary penalties impose first-order deadweight losses, implementation 
costs, and forgo gains from fiscal interactions compared with higher alcohol taxes, these drawbacks are 
offset by their advantage in targeting the drunk-driver externality more directly. Welfare gains from an 
increase in expected non-pecuniary penalties of $4 per trip (which would yield about $5 billion in revenue 
if it were a fine) yields welfare gains of $3.3 to $8.3 billion; the equivalent revenue-neutral tax on all 
alcohol users yields welfare gains of $1.9 to $6.6 billion (Table 2). The equivalent increase in expected 
drunk-driver fines yields somewhat larger welfare gains of $8.4 to $12.4 billion. 
Fourth, the optimized fine is $19.0 to $26.0 per trip, or $1.4 to $1.9 per mile of drunk driving, 
while the optimized non-pecuniary penalty is $11.2 to $13.8 per trip, or $0.8 to $1.0 per mile; prevailing 
penalties amount to $0.3 per mile. 
 
C. Individual Beverage Taxes 
  Finally, Table 4 shows the optimal tax on beer and spirits relative to that for wine under 
alternative scenarios (estimates are approximate as we ignore cross-price effects among beverages). 
Optimal taxes on beer may substantially exceed those for wine to the extent that the own- and leisure-
cross price elasticities are smaller for beer than for wine, implying a larger fiscal component to the 
optimal tax; the optimal beer tax is anything from 13 percent to 360 percent greater than that for wine for 
the scenarios illustrated. For converse reasons, the optimal tax for spirits is 53 to 93 percent of that for 




Our results suggest there is a solid efficiency case for shifting some of the tax burden off labor 
and onto alcohol, or more generally, for including higher alcohol taxes in any package of deficit-reduction 
measures to offset the need for future labor tax increases to pay for projected growth in entitlement 
spending. However, higher alcohol taxes should be seen as a complement to, rather than substitute for, 
stiffer drunk-driver penalties as, for more incremental changes, the latter policies yield welfare gains that 
are at least moderately, if not substantially, larger.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
emissions by a modest amount (for example, carbon) as opposed to a relatively large amount (for example, sulfur 
dioxide). See Goulder et al. (1997) and Parry et al. (1999).  
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One limitation of our analysis is that it does not distinguish between different quality beverages. 
While externalities call for the same tax on beverages with the same alcohol content, beyond this 
additional revenues should be raised without distorting choice among, for example, inexpensive and fine 
wines, implying that the ideal structure contains a mix of specific and ad valorem taxes.  
Distributional issues also are beyond our scope. Incidence studies suggest that alcohol taxes are 
regressive, even when income is measured on a lifetime basis (e.g., Lyon and Schwab 1995). However, 
regressivity is partly offset by benefits from revenue recycling from improved health and fewer drunk-
driver accidents and automatic indexing of benefits and income tax thresholds to the general price level; 
nonetheless, additional adjustments to the broader tax and benefit system would be required to more fully 
address distributional concerns.
19  
On the other hand, accounting for additional distortions from the tax system, particularly those in 
the capital market, and distortions between ordinary and tax-favored spending (e.g., on home ownership), 
could increase significantly the optimal alcohol tax, as there would be greater efficiency gains from 
reducing income taxes (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 1997; Parry and Bento 2000,). Further issues beyond 
our scope include possible inefficiencies from misperceptions over the risks of alcohol addiction (Kenkel 
1996); whether excise taxes are over- or under-shifted into alcohol prices (e.g., Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz 2002; Kenkel 2005); the broader social costs of alcohol abuse, such as crime and violence; and 
simultaneous optimization with other commodity taxes and the level of public spending.  
The type of analysis developed here might be applied to other problems at the nexus of public 
finance and health economics, most obviously cigarette taxation. Another possible application is the 
growing problem of obesity, where corrective taxes (e.g., on fatty foods) or subsidies (e.g., for exercise) 
might be warranted if obesity increases third-party medical costs over the lifecycle or if people lack self-
control (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006). However, the fiscal component may flip sign in this case if fast 





Aldy, Joseph E., and W. Kip Viscusi, 2006.  “Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age and Cohort 
Effects.” Discussion Paper 06-19, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
                                                      
19 A related issue is that, in theory, some of the fiscal component of the optimal alcohol tax might be incorporated 
into the income tax system rather than into the excise tax (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976). However, this possibility is 
compromised to the extent that (a) leisure is non-separable from consumption goods in utility, as suggested by 
empirical studies (e.g., Barnett 1979; Blundell and Walker 1982; and Browning and Meghir 1991); (b) individuals 
have different preferences; and (c) for practical reasons, tax rates for different income brackets differ from those that 
would minimize the equity-weighted deadweight costs of the tax system (Saez 2002).  
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Appendix A. Analytical Derivations 
Deriving equation (6) 
  Using (1) and (3), agents solve the following optimization problem: 
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  Totally differentiating the government budget constraint (2) with respect to tA, allowing tL, G
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From the zero profit condition for medical and auto insurance companies,   and 
. Substituting into  , and totally differentiating with respect to t
M v s K M M ) 1 ( − − =
D v c K D D D ) ( − = D M




















) ( ) 1 ( − − − − − =  
 













r t v c H mpc
dt
dM U


































From (5), assuming that demand for medical care operates through changes in health: 
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From totally differentiating the government budget constraint (2) with respect to tA, with tL variable and 
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Substituting (7) and (A10) into (6a), with  , gives:  A
T dt dG /0 / = = A
P dt dG
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Equating (A11) to zero, and substituting (A12) and (A13) gives (8a), where g
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Deriving (9) 
Following the derivation of (A10) above, with G
P or G



















































w t i ) (  
 
where i = P, T and   and  are defined in (6b) and (9b). Following the analogous derivation 
for equation (8) but using (A15) in place of (A10) gives (9).  




We simply our formulas for optimal drunk-driver penalties by assuming   = 0 (j 
=  t
dj dA dj dA
h / / =
D,  τD). To justify this, suppose that the average drunk driver consumes 0.03 gallons of alcohol 
(equivalent to one liter of red wine) and that 50 percent of the reduction in drunk driving in response to 
higher penalties comes from reduced heavy drinking (as opposed to people continuing to drink but using 
other transportation or drinking at home). Given an alcohol tax of $24.2 and a heavy drinking cost of $6.3 
per alcohol gallon, the welfare loss from the induced reduction in heavy drinking per drunk-driver trip is 
0.03 × 0.5 × (24.2–6.3) = $0.27 which is very small relative to the externality benefit of $23.7 per avoided 
trip (see also Kenkel 1993b). 
 
Differentiating the government budget constraint (2) with respect to j = tD, τD, with G
T and G
P 
fixed but tL variable and   = 0 gives:  dj dA/
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where 
D t σ  = 1, 
D τ σ = 0. The welfare effect from an incremental increase in penalty j can be obtained by 
following the same derivation for equation (6) above for an increase in tA, using (A16) in place of (A4), 
and with   = 0. The result is:  dj dA dj dA
h / / =
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 is the external cost gross of the fine. The analogous equations to (A9) and (A11) above are: 
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Following the analogous steps in deriving (8) above, using (A18) and (A19), gives (10). 
 
 
Deriving equation (12) 
  As discussed below the welfare effect from an incremental increase in the alcohol tax with just 
one alcohol aggregate is  . Therefore, with three beverages each with their 
own tax rate, the welfare effect from incrementally increasing one of them is given by: 
A A A i dt dA t t MEG / ) )( 1 (
* − +
 
(A20)    i k k k k i dp dA t t MEG / ) )( 1 (
* Σ − +
 
Equating (A20) to zero and substituting the own- and cross-price elasticities  i i i i ii A p dp dA / ) / ( = η  and 
k i i k ki A p dp dA / ) / ( = η , gives (12). 
 
 
Deriving equation (13) 
  Here we illustrate welfare effects for the revenue-neutral alcohol tax: derivations for the welfare 
effects of drunk-driver penalties and alternative forms of revenue recycling are analogous. From 
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Substituting (A21) in (A22) gives: 
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The last two terms cancel, after using (A12)–(A14) to substitute out for  A t L ∂ ∂ / , and noting that 
) 1 /( 1 L LL L t t t t MEG MEG
L L − = + ε . Integrating over the entire tax increase gives (13).  
 
Deriving Equation (15) 
  We can separate the compensated coefficient of alcohol with respect to the price of leisure into a 































Multiplying by  A w/ ~ , and using  L w W ~ ~





/ ( ~ ∂ ∂ = η  is the expenditure 
elasticity for alcohol (equivalent to the income elasticity with labor supply fixed).  
 
 
Appendix B. Additional Documentation for Parameter Values 
 
Alcohol consumption, taxes, and prices. Consumption of beer, wine, and spirits, in gallons of pure 
alcohol, is from NIAAA (2003). Alcohol tax revenue by beverage accruing to federal, state, and local 
governments is from TTB (2004), and TPC (2004). Dividing total tax revenue by beverage consumption 
gives the excise tax rates. The pre-tax price of alcohol is calculated by total spending on alcohol (from the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis website), less tax revenue, divided by alcohol consumption. 
 
Drunk-driver trips and conviction rate. Following NHTSA (2005) we assume that drivers with BAC 
above the legal limit account for 1/140 of nationwide passenger vehicle miles. This is based on a study 
that estimates drunk-driver miles using data on auto crashes involving alcohol, and the relative crash risk 
for sober and drunk drivers. Multiplying by passenger vehicle miles for 2000 (from BTS 2005, Table 
1.32) and dividing by an assumed average trip length of 14 miles (Gallup 2003), gives initial drunk driver 
trips of 1,287 million. There were 823,424 drunk-driver convictions in 2000 (US NHTSA 2002a, 
Summary Table 2), implying a conviction rate of 1/1,562 per trip.  
  
External costs of drunk driving. Levitt and Porter (2001) estimate that in 1994 only 16.8 percent of 
fatalities in auto accidents where one or more drivers have been drinking are external; the bulk of deaths 
occur in single-vehicle crashes where risks are internal, and external costs are also net of the “normal” 
fatality risk (i.e. that posed by sober drivers, bad weather and road conditions, etc.). Applying the same 
ratio to alcohol-related fatalities in 2000 (from US NHTSA 2002b, Table 6) gives 2,821 external 
fatalities. For fatalities, the marginal private cost mpc corresponds to estimates of the value of life, which 
captures the discounted value of foregone market and non-market time, grief to relatives, etc. US NHTSA 
(2002b) assumes a value of life of $3.2 million for all highway fatalities; Aldy and Viscusi (2006) 
estimate a higher average value, though it depends on age⎯$3.8 and $6.0 million for a 20- and 30-year-
old, respectively. As a compromise, we adopt a value of $4 million.  
 
Non-fatal injuries in alcohol-related crashes for seven injury classes (MAIS 0 to MAIS 5 and 
property damage only) are from US NHTSA (2002b), Table 10; again, we multiply by 0.168 to obtain 
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external injuries. For a given class of non-fatal injury, we obtain mpc using estimated quality-adjusted life 
years, forgone (net of tax) wages, and foregone non-market time, from US NHTSA (2002b), Table A-1. 
Aggregating over the value of fatal and non-fatal injuries, and dividing by alcohol consumption, gives a 
value for  A D H mpc D / ⋅  = $32.8 per alcohol gallon. 
 
Total property damages from drunk driving, cDD, was obtained using estimates of the (average) 
property damage associated with a given injury class (including insurance and legal costs) from US 
NHTSA (2002b). However, since part of property damages in single-vehicle crashes is an external cost 
(unlike the own-driver injury risk), these values are multiplied by excess injuries across both single- and 
multi-vehicle crashes. vDD was obtained by assuming a convicted drunk driver pays insurance premiums 
that are three times larger than otherwise for three years (Kenkel 1993a), an annual premium of $687 
(U.S. DOC 2003, Table 1225), and a 5 percent discount rate, and multiplying by drunk-driver 
convictions. Dividing by alcohol consumption gives cDD/A = $19.8, vDD/A = $3.3 and net property 
damages of $16.5 per alcohol gallon.  
 
Medical costs per injury type (including emergency services) were obtained from NHTSA 
(2002b); multiplying by the respective number of excess injuries for both single- and multi-vehicle 
crashes and aggregating gives  D M M D D ) ( + . Based on out-of-pocket expenditures in U.S. DOC 
(2003), Table 127, we set vM = 0.20. We assume a medical subsidy s = 0.4, which accounts for tax relief 
on health insurance, and Medicare payments. We are unaware of any empirical evidence on the extent to 
which medical subsides are warranted by paternalistic preferences; we assume half of the medical subsidy 
is warranted ( λ / M U  = 0.20). Putting these components together and dividing by alcohol consumption 
gives external medical costs  A D M M U v D D M M / ) )( / 1 ( + − − λ  = $6.4 per alcohol gallon. 
 
Drunk-driver Penalties. Our approach here is roughly based on Kenkel (1993a). US BOJS (2002) 
provides drunk-driver arrests by state;
20 following Kenkel (1993b, pp. 140) we assume that 80 percent of 
arrests result in conviction. 
 
Fines, jail sentences, license suspensions and other penalties for driving under the influence 
convictions by state are available from US NHTSA (2002a), Summary Table 2. We obtain the average 
penalty per conviction by assuming weights of 0.67, 0.19 and 0.14 for first-, second-, and third-time 
offenders (based on Maruschak 1999). Nationwide average penalties are obtained by weighting average 
state penalties by that state’s share in total drunk-driver convictions. The average fine per conviction is 
$295 while the average jail penalties and license suspensions are 10.4 days and 5.6 months respectively. 
Most likely, the private cost of day in jail exceeds the value of time forgone in the market or non-market 
sector due to the disutility from incarceration and stigma. One way to indirectly value a jail penalty is by 
the cost of community service that is frequently offered to convicted drunk drivers as an alternative to 
jail. For states that offer community service as an option, on average the service duration is about four 
times that of the jail penalty; we therefore value the cost of a day in jail at four times the forgone net of 
tax wage, which leads to an estimate of $2,554 for the cost of the average jail term.
21 License suspensions 
are valued at vehicle ownership and operating costs, assumed to be $20.2 per day (from 
www.aaamidatlantic.com), or $3,368 per conviction. Multiplying by total convictions of 1,029,280 for 
2000 (US BOJS 2002), the conviction rate, and dividing by alcohol consumption gives pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary penalties of   = $0.5 and  A D tD / A D D / τ  = $9.9 per alcohol gallon.  
                                                      
20 In almost all cases data is for 2000; for other cases we used data as close to 2000 as possible.  
 
21 We assume a gross daily wage of $112 from www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/home.htm#tables.  
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Government resource costs. Based on estimates for cases resulting in a guilty plea, Kenkel (1993b) 
assumes judicial costs per drunk-driver arrest of $500 for 1985, about one-seventh of the cost per arrest 
averaged over all arrests (which include protracted cases with innocent pleas for which costs per arrest are 
much higher). We obtain judicial costs of $1,600 per drunk-driver arrest by taking one-seventh of the 
nationwide average cost per arrest for 2000 (from U.S. BOJS 2004, Table 1 and U.S. BOJS 2002, Table 
4.1); dividing by the conviction rate gives a cost of $2,000. We assume police costs of $360 per drunk-
driver arrest from updating Kenkel (1993a) for inflation; this represents an average over sobriety 
checkpoints and (less costly) testing of those pulled over for reckless driving. The ratio of judicial and 
police costs per conviction to the private value of a jail term is therefore 0.95. 
 
Based on other studies, Kenkel (1993b) assumed a government resource cost of $40 per person 
per day in jail for 1985; we update this to $80 for 2000 based on the growth in costs per inmate in the 
prison system (U.S. BOJS 2004, Appendix), which is $832 per sentence, or 33 percent of the private costs 
to drunk drivers. Combined costs are therefore $3,282; multiplying by drunk-driver convictions and 
dividing by alcohol consumption gives rD/A = $6.7 per alcohol gallon.  
 
Judicial costs amount to 32 percent of the private cost per conviction. Assuming two-thirds of 
these costs are fixed and one-third vary in proportion to the total value of penalties per conviction, then 
 = 0.11 when the fine per conviction is increased. Assuming resource costs for jail terms are 
proportional to the duration of the term, then   = 0.11 + 0.33 when jail terms per conviction are 
increased. Now suppose the arrest rate per trip were doubled, that non-pecuniary penalties per conviction 
are reduced by 50 percent to keep them fixed in expected terms per trip, and that the fine per trip is 
increased to keep total penalties per conviction fixed. The increase in resource costs per dollar of 
expected fines would be   = ((450 + 2,000) + 416) – 416)/((2,554 + 3,368) × .5 + 295 + (2,554 + 3,368) 
× .5) = 0.39. Conversely, if the arrest rate were doubled with the fine and license suspension per 
conviction reduced 50 percent, and the jail penalty per trip increased to keep total penalties per conviction 
fixed, the increase in resource costs per dollar equivalent of extra expected jail penalties would be   = 
(.71 × 832 + (450 + 2000 + 1.71 × 832))/((295 + 3,368) × .5 + 2,554 + (295 + 3,368) × .5) = 0.72. 
Therefore, assuming that half of any increase in expected penalty comes from increasing the penalty per 








Drunk-driver elasticities. A study of self-reported data on drunk driving by Kenkel (1993a) implies an 
alcohol price/drunk-driving elasticity  DA η  = −0.75; this is broadly consistent with estimates of the traffic 
fatality-alcohol price elasticity, which are typically around –0.5 to –1.0 (e.g., Evans et al. 1991, 
Chaloupka et al. 1993, Ruhm 1996). It therefore seems reasonable to use the same range for  DA η  as for 
AA η . 
 
Most, though not all, studies suggest that drunk driving is responsive to stricter deterrence 
policies; for example, Chaloupka et al. (1993), Kenkel (1993b), and Mullahy and Sindelar (1994) find 
significant responses, though Evans et al. (1991) do not. Kenkel (1993b), Table 7, estimates that an 
increase in annual deterrence costs of $1,260 million (after updating to 2000) would reduce drunk driving 
by 18 percent; using our figures this would represent an increase in drunk-driver penalties of around 25 
percent, implying  DD η  ≈ −0.7. We illustrate a range of  DD η  = −0.4 to −1.0. 
 
Productivity effects. Empirical literature on the productivity effects of alcohol is very mixed (Cook and 
Moore 2000). Although some studies suggest that alcohol abuse causes reduced educational attainment 
  31Resources for the Future    Parry et al. 
 
and likelihood of full time employment (Mullahy and Sindelar 1991, 1993), others find a drinker’s bonus, 
that is, a positive association between earnings and alcohol consumption (e.g., Berger and Leigh 1988, 
Zarkin et al. 1998). However, one difficulty is controlling for confounding factors such as motivation 
(Mullahy and Sindelar 1996, pp. 413), while another is reverse causation, that is, higher wages should 
lead to more drinking given that alcohol is a normal good. Some studies attempt to address these 
problems by using instrumental variables (e.g., Kenkel and Ribar 1994; Mullahy and Sindelar 1996), 
while two recent studies by Dave and Kaestner (2001) and Cook and Peters (2005) estimate reduced form 
models relating labor market outcomes to alcohol taxes, but again reach highly conflicting results. Dave 
and Kaestner (2001) find that alcohol taxes are unrelated to employment, hours of work, and wages; in 
contrast, Cook and Peters (2005) find that higher beer taxes substantially increase the prevalence of full- 
time employment among young adults.  
 
  A further complication is that reduced form estimates of the effective labor supply/alcohol tax 
relation implicitly lump together the productivity, revenue-recycling, and tax-interaction effects. This is 
not the case for studies, such as West and Parry (2006), that regress alcohol demand on net wages; here, 
differences in net wages pick up the complementarity between alcohol and leisure, while controlling for 
alcohol taxes, and hence health status.  
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Figure 2. Fiscal Component of Optimal Alcohol Tax 
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Drunk driver trips, mn 1,287
External Costs, $/alc.gal.
Drunk driving 61.9
injuries to other road users 32.8
property damage 16.5
medical costs 6.4
government resource costs 6.7
pecuniary drunk driver penalty 0.5
non-pecuniary drunk driver penalties 9.9
Heavy drinking cost 6.3
Elasticities
Labor supply with respect to 
net wage (uncompensated) 0.15
net wage (compensated) 0.35
income -0.20
Alcohol
own price (all beverages) -0.4 to -1.0
heavy drinking with respect to alcohol price -0.4 to -1.0
cross price with respect to leisure -0.2 to 0.2
Drunk driving
with respect to alcohol price -0.4 to -1.0
own price -0.4 to -1.0
cross price with respect to leisure -0.2 to 0.35
Alcohol/health impact on earnings, $/alc. gal. 12.0 to 174.0
Marginal efficiency gain
labor tax reduction 0.11
increased public spending -0.1 to 0.2
Extra resource costs per $ of exp. penalty
fine 0.25
non-pecuniary penalty 0.58
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363 - 447 123 - 145 18 - 21 135 - 168 64 - 79 0
Overall optimal tax 437 - 592 197 - 294 95 - 167 208 - 306 137 - 217 73 - 138
Effects of increasing taxes
by 50% or to $36 per alc. gal.
% reduction in alc. consumption
net increase in revenue, $ bn.
welfare gain, $bn. 4.8 - 6.6 3.4 - 5.4 1.9 - 4.0 1.9 - 2.9 2.0 - 3.4 1.1 - 2.8
by 100% or to $48 per alc. gal.
% reduction in alc. consumption
net increase in revenue, $ bn.
welfare gain, $bn. 9.3 - 12.9 6.7 - 10.7 3.4 - 7.7 3.6 - 5.7 3.6 - 6.5 1.8 - 5.2
by 200% or to $72 per alc. gal.
% reduction in alc. consumption
net increase in revenue, $ bn.
welfare gain, $bn. 17.8 - 24.9 12.0 - 19.8 5.3 - 13.3 6.6 - 10.6 6.2 - 11.8 2.4 - 8.7
to optimal level
% reduction in alc. consumption 34.4 - 39.9 33.6 - 42.9 24.9 - 39.7 21.5 - 28.0 25.1 - 35.5 18.2 - 34.1
net increase in revenue, $ bn. 129.1 - 163.4 53.3 - 71.0 23.6 - 38.4 68.6 - 96.4 38.7 - 56.8 17.6 - 33.0
welfare gain, $bn. 70.9 - 128.0 23.1 - 52.7 5.8 - 21.8 13.7 - 31.0 8.9 - 24.5 2.4 - 12.4
5 - 70
68
Table 2. Simulations of the Optimal Alcohol Tax
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Components of opt. penalty, $/trip
Productivity effect
own-price drunk dr. elast. low middle high low middle high
drunk dr./leisure cross-price elast. low middle high low middle high
Pigouvian penalty
no increase in resource costs 23.5 23.5 23.5 9.1 16.1 23.1
with increase in resource costs 7.3 16.0 18.8 5.7 10.1 14.6
Fiscal component 16.9 2.7 -1.6 3.3 -0.7 -2.8
Overall optimal penalty 26.0 21.0 19.0 11.2 11.6 13.8
Effects of increasing penalties
by 100% or $4 per trip
% reduction in trips 24.3 38.6 50.1 24.3 38.6 50.1
net change in revenue, $bn. 5.1 5.1 5.1 -2.6 -1.5 -0.6
welfare gain, $bn. 8.4 10.6 12.4 3.3 5.5 8.3
by 200% or $8 per trip
% reduction in trips 35.7 53.8 66.8 35.7 53.8 66.8
net change in revenue, $bn. 8.5 7.5 6.9 -6.8 -4.6 -3.0
welfare gain, $bn. 11.7 13.9 15.6 4.1 6.7 10.0
to optimal level
% reduction in trips 55.4 72.4 82.7 41.5 61.5 77.6
net change in revenue, $bn. 17.8 11.2 8.5 -10.6 -7.9 -7.2
welfare gain, $bn. 14.7 16.0 17.0 4.3 6.9 10.4
1.9 1.9
Table 3. Simulations of Optimal Drunk Driver Penalties





beer/leisure cross price elasticity -0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0.2
optimal tax/optimal wine tax 3.17 1.35 4.64 1.46 2.26 1.13
Spirits
own-price elasticity
spirits/leisure cross price elasticity 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
optimal tax/optimal wine tax 0.84 0.56 0.74 0.53 0.93 0.60 0.88 0.61
Table 4. Taxes on Individual Beverages
(Approximate optimal tax relative to that on wine)
0
2.79
0.2 0
wine/leisure cross-price elasticity
-0.35
-0.88 -0.88 -1.05
-0.53 -0.35 -0.53
-1.05
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